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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we investigate the effect of brand in market
competition. Specifically, we propose a variant Hotelling
model where companies and customers are represented by
points in an Euclidean space, with axes being product fea-
tures. N companies compete to maximize their own profits
by optimally choosing their prices, while each customer in
the market, when choosing sellers, considers the sum of prod-
uct price, discrepancy between product feature and his pref-
erence, and a company’s brand name, which is modeled by a
function of its market area of the form −β · (Market Area)q,
where β captures the brand influence and q captures how
market share affects the brand. By varying the parame-
ters β and q, we derive existence results of Nash equilibrium
and equilibrium market prices and shares. In particular,
we prove that pure Nash equilibrium always exists when
q = 0 for markets with either one and two dominating fea-
tures, and it always exists in a single dominating feature
market when market affects brand name linearly, i.e., q = 1.
Moreover, we show that at equilibrium, a company’s price
is proportional to its market area over the competition in-
tensity with its neighbors, a result that quantitatively rec-
onciles the common belief of a company’s pricing power.
We also study an interesting “wipe out” phenomenon that
only appears when q > 0, which is similar to the “undercut”
phenomenon in the Hotelling model, where companies may
suddenly lose the entire market area with a small price in-
crement. Our results offer novel insight into market pricing
and positioning under competition with brand effect.
1. INTRODUCTION
According to Gartner’s recent report [9], Samsung suffered
a significant market share drop in smartphones in year 2014,
i.e., dropped from a dominant 32.1% market share in 2013
Q3 to only 24.4% in 2014 Q3. During the same time, Apple
gained a mild share growth from 12.1% to 12.7%. While
market fluctuations are normal, somewhat surprisingly, this
occurred when Samsung decreased the average selling price
(ASP) from $235 to $209 of its smartphones (targeting cus-
tomers who prefer low-end phones) while Apple steadily in-
creased its ASP (targeting customers who prefer high-end
phones) [19] [18]. This phenomenon appears to contradict
with the common belief that lowering selling prices is an
efficient way for boosting market share. Motivated by this
phenomenon, we carry out our study on market area equi-
librium based on a general model.
In our model, companies are represented by points in
an Euclidean space, where each axis denotes a particular
product feature. Consumers are located uniformly in the
same space and their coordinates specify their feature pref-
erence. Each company sets its product price. Consumers
determine their choice of companies based on the summa-
tion of the product price, discrepancy between product fea-
ture and his desire, and the brand name of the company.
In this paper, we mainly focus on one-dimensional and two-
dimensional Euclidean market space, i.e., one-feature or two-
feature, since consumers in the real world often consider
only one or two major features when choosing commodities.
For instance, the appearance and performance for smart-
phone customers, or as in the Hotelling model, where two-
dimension setting is also enough to describe a real world’s
transportation. Even so, note that many of our results can
adapt to higher dimension. Different from location-price
game models such as [15], where location-selection is part
of a strategy, our model assumes pre-determined locations
(features).1
Then, in order to study the effect of brand names, we
propose a novel brand effect measure, which has the form
of Brand effect = −β · Sq, where S is a company’s market
area, or market share under normalization, q denotes how
the market share contributes to the brand name, and β rep-
resents the degree to which customers consider the brand
names when making decisions.2 By varying the values of β
and q, we model different markets where market share has
different effect on the brand name and where customers can
have varying respect for the brand.
Note that our model is not restrictive. Consumers’ deci-
sions are often complex and are affected by various factors.
Therefore, the exact degree to which brand name affects
them has been a subject of continuous investigation, e.g.,
[2] and [3]. However, we already know that market share is
1Such a model approximates the situation when companies
are constrained by various factors and have limited flexibil-
ity in choosing product features. Doing so also allows us
to focus on the market space structure, pricing and brand
effect, three important aspects that have not been jointly
studied before in the market equilibrium context.
2In practice, different companies may have different β val-
ues. Here we use the same β value, so as to simplify the
analysis without sacrificing the economic insight.
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often considered a major valid reflection of the brand’s value
[1]. Thus, we use the market share, or market area to re-
flect the brand effect. Our model is motivated by the classic
Hotelling model [13] [5], where the total price a consumer
considers is the sum of product price and the distance be-
tween consumer and company, based on linear or quadratic
distance function.
Under our model, we first show the existence of Nash equi-
librium among N companies for the zero brand effect case,
i.e., q = 0 in both single and dual feature market. Then,
we prove the existence for the linear brand effect case, i.e.,
q = 1, in single feature market. We also derive properties
of a company’s market area and pricing strategy at equilib-
rium. In particular, we show that for any company j, the
relation between its market area and pricing at equilibrium
takes the following concise form :
Pricej ∝ Marketj
Competition Intensity
. (1)
Moreover, competition intensity increases as β grows. This
result gives an explicit characterization of the equilibrium
price and market area.
Besides giving the description of the equilibrium, we also
discover and analyze an interesting “wipe out” phenomenon
that can occur in the market when β exceeds certain thresh-
old value: some companies’ market area will immediately
shrink to zero with an arbitrarily small price increment. This
kind of “sudden death” phenomenon is very similar to the
“undercut phenomenon” in the Hotelling model with linear
distance function.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as
follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to con-
nect brand name effect to the market space and ana-
lyze the market equilibrium in this case.
• We develop techniques to prove the existence of market
equilibrium when agents’ utility functions are piece-
wise continuous. This enables us to handle the situ-
ation when neighbor competitors change dynamically.
• We show that one company’s pricing power is propor-
tional to its market area at market equilibrium and is
inversely proportional to competition intensity.
• We develop the dimensionality reduction reasoning ap-
proach that allows us to extend the problem into higher
dimension.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follow: Sec-
tion 2 reviews the existing literature. Section 3 presents our
model and setting, and Section 4 gives the market struture
analysis results. Section 5 and 6 have the results for cases
q = 0 and q = 1. Conclusions come at the last and proofs
are in appendix.
1.1 Notations
Bold symbol x denotes a vector and capital italic symbol
X denotes a set. cl(X ) and int(X ) denote the closure and
the interior of X . We use X = |X | to denote its volume,
e.g., if S denotes the set of points in a unit circle on a plane,
S = |S| denotes its area. Exclusion of a set is denoted by
X/A = {x |x ∈ X , x /∈ A}.
2. RELATEDWORK
Market analysis has been a subject with extensive studies.
In Hotelling’s seminal paper [13], an one-dimensional two-
seller market with linear shipping cost was considered. It is
concluded in the paper that companies follow the “Principle
of Minimum Differentiation” in competition, which states
that companies choose similar strategy in location and pric-
ing. Later, [5] pointed out that location-price equilibrium
may not always exists under the linear cost model, and a
quadratic distance function was used instead to assure the
existence of equilibrium. The paper also proves the prin-
ciple of maximal differentiation holds, which indicates that
companies tend to produce products with opposite charac-
teristics.
Since then a lot of works have been done to deepen our
understanding about market equilibrium. [4] proved the ex-
istence of mixed strategy of this two-stage game, and [16]
proved the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium in pure
strategy in an one-dimensional torus market. In [20], the
market was extended to two-dimensional and they showed
that maximal differentiation in one dimension is enough for
existence of equilibrium. [15] extended the market to multi-
dimensions and showed that firms tend to maximize the dif-
ference in the dominant dimension but minimize differenti-
ation in other dimensions. [17] also showed similar results
for a duoplay two-dimensional market.
Besides the existence results, properties of market area
have also received a lot of attentions. Boundary of market
with respect to different distance costs was studied in [8],
[14], and [12]. Researchers also studied the brand effect in
[22], where it was divided into two types as inertial and cost-
based, while [21] and [10] studied the brand choice through
repeated learning and Markov process. The main difference
between previous studies on brand effects and our work is
that we use market area to reflects brand effect, which is
by far the first to connect market space and brand name in
analyzing market equilibrium, while previous works usually
treat the brand name effect and market separately.
3. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Consider an abstract market modeled by theK-dimensional
Euclidean space M = RK , where each axis represents one
feature of the products in consideration. For example,M =
R2 can represent the smartphone market, where one coordi-
nate can be the camera quality and the other coordinate can
be the CPU speed of the phone. As another example, M
can represent the market in the most traditional way as in
the Hotelling model [13], in which case coordinates denote
the locations of companies and customers.
We use N ′ to denote the set of companies in the market.
Each company’s coordinates in the market are fixed and are
represented by a point xk ∈ M, ∀k ∈ N ′. Without loss
of generality, we assume that companies are placed all over
the market.3 For simplicity, we assume that all companies
produce products different only in features we consider, with
zero cost and no limit on production capacity. Since there
are infinitely many companies in the market, we only focus
on some chosen companies among them. Specifically, let
Mchosen(B) = {x | ‖x‖∞ ≤ B/2} be a cube in M with
edge length being B and use N to denote companies inside
3That is, for all x0 ∈ M, ∃r < ∞ such that there exists at
least one company in the ball {x| ‖x− x0‖2 < r}
Mchosen(B), i.e.,
N = {k |xk ∈Mchosen(B), k ∈ N ′}
Then, we focus on the companies located insideMchosen(B)4
and we choose B so that N = |N | > 0. In other words, we
assume an unbounded market with infinite companies, but
discuss only those inside a bounded set. Doing so allows
us to eliminate the boundary effect as in [13] while not ig-
noring the competition between companies reside near the
boundaries.5
We denote Pi the product price of a company i, which is
the price it charges for its product. We assume that Pi ∈
[0, Pupper], where Pupper is some sufficiently large but finite
price upper bound for every company. To gain accurate
result on the chosen objects, in the following, we assume
that the product prices of companies outside Mchosen(B)
always remain constant and only consider the competition
among companies in Mchosen(B). That is,
Pj ≡ Pj0, ∀ j ∈ N ′/N .
We then use P = (Pi, i ∈ N ) to denote the price vector for
the companies in consideration.
The points inM denote the set of customers, where each
coordinate specifies a customer’s desired value of that fea-
ture. Then, each customer will choose to purchase one unit
product from a company that provides maximum satisfac-
tion. For instance, customers often first care about the prod-
uct price when choosing companies. Then, they will also
take into account the personal preferences, e.g., smartphone
buyers may prefer the ones that match his usage require-
ments, while coffee buyers may prefer the shops at closer dis-
tances. Furthermore, they may also value the brand name of
a company when making decisions. To model this customer
behavior, we denote Pi{x} the aggregate price customer x
sees from company i (its components will be specified later)
and assume that customers always purchase at companies
that offer the lowest price. By choosing different forms of
Pi{x}, one can take into account various factors.
With the aggregate prices, we define the ownership of a
customer and the market area of a company as follows:
Definition 1. (Ownership) O′(x,P) is the set of compa-
nies who offer the lowest aggregate price at any x ∈ M,
i.e.,
O′(x,P) = {i | i ∈ argminPi{x}}. (2)
In other words, customers always choose to purchase goods
at companies that offer the lowest price.
Definition 2. (Market area) Company i’s market area is
given by Si = |Si|, where Si is the set of customers for which
i is the unique owner, i.e.,
Si = {x | O′(x,P) = {i}}. (3)
4Note that there are many ways to delimit the area, we use
Mchosen(B) for simplicity in presentation, since it becomes
a square in 2D market.
5Note that this is important. As an example, suppose we
define a city block asMchosen(B). Then, customers live near
the edge will go to the coffee shop at the next block if they
find that more worthwhile. Hence, companies at the corners
still face competition from those outside the bounded set.
In (3) we only consider customers that strictly prefer com-
pany i to others. Later we will see that this is not re-
strictive, as almost all customers choose only one company.
The boundary of company i’s market area is denoted by
BR(i) = cl(Si)/int(Si).
Definition 3. (Surviving companies) A company i is called
surviving if Si > 0.
Similarly, surviving owners of x, denoted by O(x,P), is
the set of companies who provide the lowest price among all
surviving companies at x, i.e.,
O(x,P) = {i | i ∈ argmini∈{j|Sj>0} Pi{x}}.
In this work, unless otherwise stated, we focus on the
following general Pi{x} function:
Pi{x} = Pi +D(x,xi)− βSqi , β, q ≥ 0. (4)
Here the first term in Pi{x} is company i’s mill price. The
second term D(x,xi) is a distance function, which captures
customer x’s disutility due to the difference between his pre-
ferred product feature profile and that offered by company
i. The last term models the brand effect, i.e., how much a
company’s brand name helps in attracting customers. The
parameter q captures how brand is related to the market
area (or market share), and β denotes how much customers
value the brand name when making purchase decisions. By
varying the values of q and β, our model captures a wide
range of brand effect in a market.6
The objective of each company i is to choose the price Pi,
so as to maximize its revenue, i.e.,
Wi = Pi · Si. (5)
For tractability, in this paper, we restrict our attentions
mainly to the single-feature market M = R (1D) and the
dual-feature marketM = R2 (2D).We also use the common
L2 Euclidean norm as the distance measure, i.e.,
D(x,xi) = ||x− xi||22. (6)
Note that linear and pure quadratic distance functions are
commonly adopted for market analysis, e.g., [13], [5]. We
also use dij = D(xi,xj) to denote the distance between i
and j.
We remark here that our model is different from the clas-
sic Hotelling model [13], where companies also choose their
locations as part of their strategies. It has been shown in
[5] that no equilibrium exists under that model, even with
two companies with linear distance costs. We instead focus
on the case when company locations (features) are prede-
termined. This models markets where locations cannot be
arbitrarily determined by companies.
We now define the following notions that will be used
repeatedly.
Definition 4. (Neighbor) The neighbors of i are the sur-
viving owners of BR(i), i.e., NR(i) = {j | j 6= i, ∃x ∈
BR(i), s.t. j ∈ O(x,P)}.
Definition 5. (Nash Equilibrium) Given the company price
vector P∗ = (P ∗i , i ∈ N ) = (P ∗i , P ∗−i), we say that the mar-
ket is at pure strategy Nash equilibrium if
P ∗i = argmaxPiW (Pi, P
∗
−i), ∀ i ∈ N .
6Here we assume that the β value is the same for all cus-
tomers.
That is, no company can improve its profit by changing its
price unilaterally.
Since we only study pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we
will use Nash equilibrium for short in the rest of the paper. It
is clear that the Individual Rationality (IR) condition always
holds since Wi = Pi ·Si ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . Besides, when β =
0, every company can survive by setting a very small price
and gaining the customers close to its position. For general
positive β values, however, some companies may have zero
market area even when they adopt a zero price.
Companies compete directly with their neighbors on mar-
ket share. Meanwhile, we define the notion of a potential
competitor, which will be useful for our later analysis.
Definition 6. (Potential competitor) Company j is called
a potential competitor of company i if it satisfies any one of
the following conditions:
(a) If Sj = 0, there exists x ∈ cl(Si), such that Pj{x} =
Pi{x}.
(b) If j ∈ NR(i), |cl(Sj)∩cl(Si)||BR(i)| = 0.
In the case when Condition (a) holds, with an increment
in Pi, j may survive and become an actual competitor of
i. Condition (b) can appear in the 2D market where j is
a neighbor of i, yet the length of their border line is zero,
i.e., their market area only intersect at one point. Thus, i
may start facing a direct competition from j if Pi increases.
The existence of potential competitors captures the general
dynamics of different markets. However, it also greatly com-
plicates the problem and requires a very different analysis
from previous work.
Last, we have the following theorem from [11] [6] [7], which
will be used later for proving the existence of Nash equilib-
rium.
Theorem 1 ([11][6][7]). For a game with compact con-
vex strategy space, if each player i’s payoff function Wi(P)
is continuous in P and quasiconcave in Pi, there exists a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
4. MARKETAREAANDOWNERSHIPANAL-
YSIS
We now present our results for market area and owner-
ship. Unless otherwise stated, results in this section apply
to general K-dimensional markets.
Lemma 1. For any customer x in the market , there ex-
ists at least one surviving company who owns him, i.e.,
|O(x,P)| > 0 for all x ∈M.
Lemma 1 shows that O(x,P) ⊆ O′(x,P). Thus, each
customer has at least one surviving owner.
We now have the first main theorem of the paper:
Theorem 2. For any surviving company i in the market,
S ′i = {x | i ∈ O′(x,P)} is a convex polyhedron, and S ′i =
cl(Si).
Proof. Consider the surviving companies. We only show
the case in 2D, since situations in other dimensions are sim-
ilar. First note that the set of market area where company
i and j provide the same price is a straight line (hyperplane
in high dimension) given by:
Li,j = {(x, y)|Pi + (x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 − βSi
−[Pj + (x− xj)2 + (y − yj)2 − βSj ] = 0}
= {(x, y)|2x(xi − xj) + 2y(yi − yj)− Pi + Pj
−βSj + βSi + x2j + y2j − x2i − x2j = 0}
This line divides the plane into 2 open half space Hi(i, j),
Hj(i, j), where in Hi(i, j) we have Pi{(x, y)} < Pj{(x, y)}
and in Hj(i, j) we have Pj{(x, y)} < Pi{(x, y)}. Thus, for
any point x = (x, y) ∈ Hi(i, j), we have j /∈ O(x) and vice
versa. Let Ui = ∩j∈N ,j 6=iHi(i, j), since Ui is the intersection
of half spaces, Ui is a convex polygon.
Now we prove that Ui = Si. For any x ∈ Si, we have
O(x) = {i}. Hence, x ∈ Hi(i, j),∀j 6= i. Thus, x ∈
∩j∈N ,j 6=iHi(i, j) = Ui and Si ∈ Ui. For any x ∈ Ui, we
see that j /∈ O(x) if j 6= i. Since O(x) 6= ∅, O(x) = {i},
Ui ∈ Si and Ui = Si.
It remains to show that S ′i = cl(Ui). For any x ∈ cl(Ui),
we have Pi{x} ≤ Pj{x}, ∀j 6= i. Hence, i ∈ O(x) and
x ∈ S ′i, which implies cl(Ui) ∈ S ′i. Now consider any x ∈ S ′i.
Since for all x′ ∈ cl(UCi ), where cl(UCi ) = M/cl(Ui) is the
complementary set of cl(Ui), we have i /∈ O(x′). Thus, we
must have x ∈ cl(Ui) and S ′i ∈ cl(Ui).
In conclusion, S ′i = cl(Ui), and S ′i = cl(Si).
From Theorem 2 we know that in the 1D market, each sur-
viving company’s market consists of only one bounded con-
tinuous interval, while in the 2D market, it consists of a
polygon.
5. MARKET EQUILIBRIUMWHEN Q = 0
In this section, we present our results for the 1D and 2D
markets with q = 0, i.e., the brand names do not affect
customers. In this case, the aggregate price of company i
simplifies to:
Pi{x} = Pi + ||x− xi||22 − β, β ≥ 0. (7)
5.1 Single-feature (1D) market
In this case the market is an infinite line and N denotes
the set of companies in some arbitrarily chosen nonempty in-
terval [−B/2, B/2], with finite number of companies N > 0.
For simplicity, we denote di , di,i+1 = xi+1−xi. From The-
orem 2, we can use Si = (Li, Ri) to denote each surviving
company i’s market area, where Li , inf{x : x ∈ Si} and
Ri , sup{x : x ∈ Si} are the boundary points.
Theorem 3. In the 1D market, Nash equilibrium always
exists when q = 0.
Theorem 3 is proved by showing the utility function of a
company is exactly a parabola. Before proving the theorem,
we first have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. In the 1D market, let xi denote the i-th sur-
viving company in increasing order of their coordinates. We
have Li = Ri−1 for all i ∈ NS(P).
Proof. (Theorem 3) From (7) we see that when q = 0,
the brand effect factor will be the same to every companies,
regardless of the β value. Thus, we consider β = 0.
For any companies i, other companies’ aggregate prices
at xi = xi are always positive due to distance. Hence, for
any companies i, given P−i, i can always set a price Pi such
that Si > 0. Therefore, every company will survive in the
market.
For company i, by Theorem 2 and Lemma 3, we know that
i’s market area will be an interval on the line, with neighbors
always being i − 1, i + 1, which satisfy xi−1 < xi < xi+1.
The right boundary of i− 1 and i can be calculated as:
Pi + (Ri−1 − xi)2 = Pi−1 + (Ri−1 − xi−1)2
Pi + (Ri − xi)2 = Pi+1 + (Ri − xi+1)2
Thus, the utility Wi is given by:
Wi =PiSi = Pi(Ri −Ri−1)
=− P 2i ( 1
2di
+
1
2di−1
)
+ Pi(
Pi+1 + x
2
i+1 − x2i
2di
− Pi−1 − x
2
i + x
2
i−1
2di−1
). (8)
Hence, the profit will be a downward parabola for Pi ∈
[0,
Pi+1+x
2
i+1−x2i
2di
−Pi−1−x
2
i+x
2
i−1
2di−1
1
2di
+ 1
2di−1
] and zero otherwise.
The payoff of i is continuous in P, quasiconcave in Pi.
From theorem 1, Nash equilibrium always exists.
Theorem 4. In the 1D market with q = 0, when market
is at equilibrium, we must have:
Pi =
2didi−1
di + di−1
Si, ∀i ∈ N . (9)
Proof. When the market is at equilibrium, we have:
dWi
dPi
= Si + Pi
dSi
dPi
= 0
and
dSi
dPi
=
1
2di
+
1
2di−1
.
Combining these two equations proved the theorem.
Theorem 4 tells us that a company’s price is proportional
to its market area at equilibrium. The coefficient
2didi−1
di+di−1 is
a constant for one company since their locations are fixed.
Denote 1
γ
=
2didi−1
di+di−1 , or γ =
1
2
( 1
di
+ 1
di−1 ). Notice that with
bigger di, di−1 values, we will have a smaller γ, which im-
plies higher equilibrium prices with the same market area.
Therefore, γ can be viewed as competition intensity, i.e., far-
ther distance between companies mitigates the competition
and increase company profit. This is similar to the maxi-
mal differentiation principle [5], which means that compa-
nies should not choose similar positions in the market, i.e.
larger di values. The simple form in Theorem 4 that equi-
librium price is determined by market area over competition
intensity appears to match our intuition that companies with
more market share or less competition in products usually
have more pricing power.
5.2 Dual-feature (2D) market
We now turn to the 2D case. The biggest problem of ana-
lyzing 2D market is that companies’ neighbors may change
during their price change (as showed in Figure1), while in 1D
market, company i’s neighbors will always be i−1 and i+1.
Due to the change in neighbors, companies’ utility functions
will be piecewise, i.e., utility function changes everytime a
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Company i (the one in the middle with
blue colour) has 4 neighbors at price Pi; (b)When i
increases its price, its market area shrinks from the
dotted quadrangle to the blue triangle, and it has
only 3 neighbors now.
x0i
x0ij
x0j
j
i xuk
x0uk
xkj
xkh
xjh
xhv
x0hv
(a) (b)
boundary at Pi
boundary at Pi + dP
lij
Figure 2: (a) Set an axis with xi, xj on it so that
we turn the 2D problem into 1D. Here x′i, x
′
j, and x
′
ij
denote the coordinates of xi, xj and boundary line
lij on the axis, respectively. (b) When i increases its
price from Pi to Pi + dP , boundary between i and j
disappears.
neighbor comes or goes. Moreover, since companies’ loca-
tions are given arbitrarily, the shape of an company’s mar-
ket area may be irregular, which makes the analysis more
difficult.
Our method to overcome these difficulties is to transform
the problem into 1D. Figure 2 shows such an example. We
set an axis on two neighboring companies i and j, i.e., they
are both on the axis as shown in Figure 2 (a). Since the
border line is straight and perpendicular to the axis, the
position of the border line can be described in one dimension
axis by variable x′ij . The direction of the axis is determined
by the way such that x′i < x
′
ij < x
′
j . Note that there is
only one way to determine this axis once the direction is
set, since dij is constant. In this case, we have our second
main theorem in the paper.
Theorem 5. In the 2D market, Nash equilibrium always
exists when q = 0.
Proof. (Sketch) We prove Theorem 5 as follows. We
first show that Si(Pi) and Wi(Pi) are continuous and that
Wi(Pi) is twice differentiable within each continuous piece.
Then, we calculate d
2Wi
dP2i
, which turns out to be downward
parabola in each pieces:
d2Wi
dP 2i
= −
∑
j∈NB(i)
6M˜ijP
2
i + 5N˜ijPi + C
2
ij,1 + C
2
ij,2
dij lij
.
Here M˜ij , N˜ij are related to the location of i and j, Cij,1,
Cij,2 are related to the location of two end points of i and j’s
border, and lij denotes the length of border line between i
and j. We then show its monotonicity, that is, the functions
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d2W
dP 2i
Figure 3: An example of d
2Wi
dP2i
. Each piece of d
2Wi
dP2i
is
a fragment from an increasing downward parabola,
therefore d
2Wi
dP2i
is a monotonically increasing function
on [0, Pupper].
are monotone within each differential interval and mono-
tone at each discontinuous point (Fig. 3 shows an example).
Specifically, we first show that each pieces is on the left side
of its axis of symmetry and prove monotonicity inside each
pieces. For the discontinuous point between two pieces, the
situation is shown in Fig. 2 (b): i and j’s boundary lij dis-
appears when i increases its price from Pi to Pi + dP , i.e.,
i’s boundary changes from xukxkjxjhxhv to x′ukx
′
khx
′
hv. We
have applied triangle inequality on the triangle 4xkhxkjxjh
to show that d
2Wi
dP2i
increases after the change of neighbors.
Lastly, we prove that company i’s payoff function is quasi-
concave in Pi and then prove the existence of equilbrium.
This theorem guarantees the existence of equilibrium in 2D
market, regardless of the change in each company’s neigh-
bors, or the change in the shape and location of their market
area.
Theorem 6. In the 2D market with q = 0, when the mar-
ket is at Nash equilibrium, we have:
Pi =
1∑
j∈NR(i)
lij
2dij
Si, ∀i ∈ N . (10)
The factor γ =
∑
j∈NR(i)
lij
2dij
represents the competition
intensity. For a company i, farther distance to competi-
tors (bigger dij) can reduce the competition intensity, while
longer contiguous border (smaller lij) increases it.
6. MARKET EQUILIBRIUMWHEN Q = 1
In this section, we discuss the situation when q = 1, i.e.,
when the market area has a linear relationship with the
brand name. We show that the interesting “wipe out” phe-
nomenon appears when q > 0 (In particular, it happens
when q = 1).
The “wipe out” phenomenon substantially increases the
difficulty in analyzing the problem, because in this case a
company’s market area can suddenly shrinks to zero after
some threshold price. In this case, its neighbors’ utility func-
tions are not continuous. This is exactly the same problem
as in the classic Hotelling model, where “undercut” destroys
the continuity of the utility function, and therefore lead to
the non-existence of equilibrium.
Since this case is very different from the previous cases
due to the “wipe out” phenomenon, we first discuss it below
before presenting the existence and necessary conditions for
equilibrium. We focus on the 1D market and q = 1.
6.1 The “Wipe-out" Phenomenon
Fix P−i = (P1, ...Pi−1, Pi+1, ...PN ) and consider Pi = 0. If
Si(Pi = 0) = 0, then Wi(Pi) = 0 for all Pi ∈ [0, Pupper] and
it is concave. If Si(Pi = 0) > 0, let us gradually increase Pi
from zero and consider a price Pi ∈ [0, Pupper] during this
process. Denote its surviving left and right neighbors by
i− 1, i+ 1, and denote Ri as the right boundary of i. Recall
that in this case, Pi{Ri} = Pi + (Ri − xi)2 − βSi. Thus, we
have:
Pi{Ri} = Pi+1{Ri}
Pi{Ri−1} = Pi−1{Ri−1} (11)
Suppose now i changes its price by a small amount dPi, i.e.,
P ′i = Pi+dPi, such that i−1, i+1 still remain its neighbors,
i.e., they still survive. Denote dRi and dRi−1 the deviations
of the right and left boundaries of i. The change of market
area for i can then be written as dSi = dRi − dRi−1, and
the price of i at new boundary is:
P ′i{Ri + dRi} = Pi + dPi + (Ri + dRi − xi)2 − β(Si + dSi).
Similar to (11), we have two equations for the new bound-
aries:
P ′i{Ri + dRi} = P ′i+1{Ri + dRi}
P ′i{Ri−1 + dRi−1} = P ′i−1{Ri−1 + dRi−1}. (12)
By subtracting (11) from (12), we have:
dSi(1− β
2di
− β
2di−1
) = −dPi( 1
2di
+
1
2di−1
)− β dSi+1
2di
−β dSi−1
2di−1
. (13)
In fact, when we gradually change Pi from 0 to Pupper, Si
will decrease. This is because with any small increment in
Pi, at least customers at i’s boundary will change to pur-
chase at a different company. Due to area decrease, i will
lose even more customers. Similar analysis shows that i+ 1
and i − 1 will have a positive market area deviation shown
in (13).
Hence, the right hand side of (13) and dSi in the left hand
side will remain negative when dPi > 0, implying that 1 −
β
2di
− β
2di−1 > 0, or equivalently β <
2didi−1
di+di−1 . Since during
the price increment, i’s area will shrink and i’ neighbors
will change, once a close neighbor of i with
2didi−1
di+di−1 < β
gains a positive market area (the new neighbor is denoted
by i − 1), i’s area will immediately shrink to 0, i.e., “wipe
out” happens.
Let us try to understand the meaning of upper bound
2didi−1
di+di−1 for β. Suppose we hide company i from the market
just for the moment, i.e., i is invisible to customers. Since
i− 1 and i+ 1 remain activated, they will share i’s previous
market area. Let R′ denote i− 1 and i+ 1’s boundary, and
P˜i−1{x} denote the aggregate price of i − 1 at x when i is
hidden. Since their price at boundary will be the same, i.e.,
P˜i−1{R′} = P˜i+1{R′}, and note that xi+1−xi−1 = di+di−1,
we have:
R′ =
Pi+1 − Pi−1 − βSi+1 + βSi−1
2(di + di−1)
+
xi+1 + xi−1
2
(14)
Now let i come back to the market. If i’s price at R′ is
higher than the price of i− 1 or i+ 1 here, i.e., P˜i+1{R′}, or
P˜i−1{R′}, then i will have no market area. This is because
if Pi{R′} > P˜i−1{R′}, for any δ > 0, at market point R′−δ,
we have Pi{R′ − δ} − P˜i−1{R′ − δ} = Pi{R′} − P˜i−1{R′}+
2di−1δ > 0, similarly we always have Pi{R′+δ} > P˜i+1{R′+
δ}, which means i will have no market area either at x < R′
or x > R′.
Consider the price gap between i and i−1 at R′, by equa-
tion (14), we have:
P˜i−1{R′} − Pi{R′} = 2
di + di−1
Ψ, (15)
where Ψ , Pi+1+d
2
i−βSi+1−Pi
2di
+
Pi−1+d2i−1−βSi−1−Pi
2di−1 . If
Ψ < 0, which means Pi{R′} > P˜i−1{R′}, accroding to the
analysis above, i will have no market area. Hence, if i sur-
vives, we must have Ψ > 0. When i is activated in the
market, with the two equations in (11), we have
(1− β
2di
− β
2di−1
)Si =
Pi+1 + d
2
i − βSi+1 − Pi
2di
(16)
+
Pi−1 + d2i−1 − βSi−1 − Pi
2di−1
= Ψ (17)
Interestingly, Ψ from (15) appears in (17) again. From
(17), it is now clear that if i survives, we must have Si > 0
and Ψ > 0. Hence, we must have (1− β
2di
− β
2di−1 ) > 0, i.e.,
β <
2didi−1
di+di−1 , if i is not wiped out.
6.2 Existence of Equilibrium
So far we have introduced the“wipe out”phenomenon and
explained the bound for β in two ways. Now we show the
existence of equilibrium.
Theorem 7. Nash equilibrium always exists in the 1D
market with q = 1.
Proof. (Sketch)(a) To prove this theorem, we first show
that when there is no “wipe out,” i.e., β is small such that
β <
2didi−1
di+di−1 , ∀i, Nash equilibrium exists. Under the no
“wipe out” condition, one can guarantee that the utility
function of a company is a piecewise continuous function.
The main difficulty in proving the quasi-concavity here is in
showing that there exists a threshold price, such that the
utility function is non-decreasing before the price exceeds it,
and non-increasing after.
(b) For the case when β <
2didi−1
di+di−1 does not hold for all
i, we construct an equilibrium with a set of carefully chosen
“activated” companies, while the others are considered “hid-
den.” Then, we show that this partial equilibrium among
the chosen companies turns out to be exactly the equilib-
rium for all companies. We can operate in the following way
to give at least one equilibrium. We choose some companies
to be hidden, which means they can be seen as not existed in
the market, while the others being “activated.” For the sim-
plicity in presentation below, we define a condition among
those activated companies:
β <
2didi−1
di + di−1
∀ activated company i. (18)
The way we choose is as follow: (i) Hide all companies first.
Then activate companies one by one until we can not acti-
vate any one more companies without bringing “wipe out”
phenomenon into the market. That is, all activated com-
panies satisfied the condition (44), but activating any one
of the hidden companies will violates it. (ii) Among all ac-
tivation schemes in (i), we can guarantee that there exists
at least one scheme such that for any one hidden company,
say j, it violates the inequality β <
2djdj−1
dj+dj−1 . This is be-
cause if β <
2djdj−1
dj+dj−1 is satisfied for j, according to (i), there
must exists one or two of its neighbors, say k, such that
β >
2dkdk−1
dk+dk−1
, in that case, we can always activate j and
hide k. (iii) Now that all activated companies satisfy the
condition (44), while each hidden company is being “wiped
out”.
Then for activated companies there exists equilibrium as
proved in (a). Now let those hidden companies come back to
the market with their prices being Pupper. From the analysis
of equation (15), we can see that hidden company i will never
survive by unilateral price change. For any activated com-
pany j, since hidden companies are being ”wiped out”(at the
status of price being Pupper and have no market area), they
can never survive by j’s unilateral action. Hence, j’s price
will remain unchanged. This setting guarantees at least one
equilibrium when β <
2didi−1
di+di−1 , ∀i does not hold.
6.3 Necessary condition for equilibrium
Theorem 8. When a market with dimension K is at a
Nash equilibrium, for any company i, if it has no potential
competitors,
P ∗i = ci · S∗i , ∀i ∈ NS (19)
where ci = − dPidSi |Pi=P∗i > 0.
Otherwise, we have:
c′i · S∗i ≤ P ∗i ≤ c′′i · S∗i , ∀i ∈ NS . (20)
Here c′i = − dPidSi |Pi=P∗i + > 0, c
′′
i = − dPidSi |Pi=P∗i − > 0.
Inequality (46) becomes an equality only when i’s potential
competitor does not survive at P ∗i .
In particular, when the market is 1D or 2D, and β << di
holds for all i, we have: ci = − dPidSi |Pi=P∗i ≈
1−β∑j∈NR(i) lij2dij∑
j∈NR(i)
lij
2dij
(
βlij
2dij
+1)
.
Equation (45) is similar to Theorem 4, where the equilib-
rium price is proportional to market area. Inequality (46)
shows that potential competitors restrict the pricing power
of a company, which results in lower selling price and hence
lower profit compare to (45). Since potential competitors are
closer than actual competitors in market, once they survive,
they can cause significant harm to a company’s market area
and profit, due to the close similarity in product features
and high substitutability.
In addition, a company with larger market area can widen
the market share gap by expanding the dimension of market,
i.e., actively compete with weaker competitors using prod-
ucts different in multi-features. This is because market area
gap in high dimension can be much bigger than the cases in
1D market, which in return will result in bigger aggregate
price gap.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study equilibrium properties based on
a variant Hotelling model, considering brand name effect
in the market by including a market area term into aggre-
gate price. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium in
single-feature and dual-feature market, and also derive ex-
plicit characterizations of equilibrium prices and market ar-
eas. Our results reconcile the common belief that company’s
pricing power is proportional to its market area over com-
petition intensity, and offer insight into pricing under brand
name effect and market positioning.
Specifically, our results offer the following insight: (i)
When there is no brand effect or equivalent brand effect, i.e.,
β or q is zero, the equilibrium price of a company is propor-
tional to its market area (market power) over the competi-
tion intensity with its neighbors (boundary over distance).
This implies that lowering prices does not necessarily lead to
market share increase, as observed in the smartphone mar-
ket, where the competition intensity may be higher for cus-
tomers who prefer low-end phones. (ii) When brand name
has a positive effect in attracting customers, it is important
to lower the price and seize more market area. Meanwhile,
companies with big market areas should try to steer cus-
tomers’ shopping habits towards emphasizing on brand rep-
utation (increase brand factor). (iii) New companies should
try to avoid markets where the brand factor is large, in which
case big companies are at strong advantage, and to avoid
positioning at market points where competition is intense
(many nearby companies), where due to the “wipe out” phe-
nomenon, small companies may not be able to survive.
8. APPENDIX
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that for some x0, Si =
0 for all i ∈ O′(x0). Suppose there is no company located
on the point x0. Define a neighborhood ball of x0, i.e.,
Ball{x0} = {x| ||x − x0||2 < δ}. Let δ to be small enough
such that there are no companies in this neighborhood ball.
This is possible since the number of companies is finite.
The lowest and highest aggregate price that a company
i offers in this ball, denoted by Pi,low and Pi,high, will be
at the two intersect points between the ball and the line
connecting xi and x0.
Then, the price of any company k /∈ O′(x0) at x ∈ Ball{x0}
satisfies Pk{x} ≥ Pk,low = Pk{x0} + δ2 − 2δ ‖xk − x0‖2,
and the price of any company j ∈ O′(x0) satisfies Pj{x} ≤
Pj,high = Pj{x0}+δ2+2δ ‖xj − x0‖2. If maxj∈O′(x0) Pj,high <
mink/∈O′(x0) Pk,low, we can make sure that all owners of mar-
ket points in this ball will be in O′(x0). Thus, we can choose
δ <
(mink/∈O′(x0) Pk{x0}−Pj{x0})
maxm/∈O′(x0),n∈O(x0) 2(‖xm−x0‖2+‖xn−x0‖2)
to guarantee
that all owners of market points in this ball are in O′(x0).
Hence,
∑
j∈O′(x0) Sj > 0, and |O′(x0)| ≤ N , which violates
the assumption that Sj = 0,∀j ∈ O′(x0).
As for the case when there is a company located exactly
on x0, if company x0 ∈ O′(x0), the analysis will be the
same. Otherwise the analysis still holds since we always
have Pj{x0} < Pk{x0} for k /∈ O′, j ∈ O′ regardless of
δ.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Consider the surviving companies. We first see
that the set of market area where company i and j provide
the same price is a straight line(hyperplane in high dimen-
sion) given by:
Li,j = {(x, y)|Pi + (x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 − βSi
−[Pj + (x− xj)2 + (y − yj)2 − βSj ] = 0}
= {(x, y)|2x(xi − xj) + 2y(yi − yj)− Pi + Pj
−βSj + βSi + x2j + y2j − x2i − x2j = 0}
This line divides the plane into 2 open half spaceHi(i, j),Hj(i, j),
where in Hi(i, j) we have Pi{(x, y)} < Pj{(x, y)} and in
Hj(i, j) we have Pj{(x, y)} < Pi{(x, y)}. Thus, for any
point x = (x, y) ∈ Hi(i, j), we have j /∈ O(x) and vice
versa. Let Ui = ∩j∈N ,j 6=iHi(i, j), since Ui is the intersection
of half spaces, Ui is a convex polygon.
Now we prove that Ui = Si. For any x ∈ Si, we have
O(x) = {i}. Hence, x ∈ Hi(i, j),∀j 6= i. Thus, x ∈
∩j∈N ,j 6=iHi(i, j) = Ui and Si ∈ Ui. For any x ∈ Ui, we
see that j /∈ O(x) if j 6= i. Since O(x) 6= ∅, O(x) = {i},
Ui ∈ Si and Ui = Si.
It remains to show that S ′i = cl(Ui). For any x ∈ cl(Ui),
we have Pi{x} ≤ Pj{x}, ∀j 6= i. Hence, i ∈ O(x) and
x ∈ S ′i, which implies cl(Ui) ∈ S ′i. Now consider any x ∈ S ′i.
Since for all x′ ∈ cl(UCi ), where cl(UCi ) =M− cl(Ui) is the
complementary set of cl(Ui), we have i /∈ O(x′). Thus, we
must have x ∈ cl(Ui) and S ′i ∈ cl(Ui).
In conclusion, S ′i = cl(Ui), and S ′i = cl(Si).
8.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Before proving the theorem, we first have the following
lemma, whose proof will be given after the proof of Theorem
3.
Lemma 3. In the 1D market, let xi denote the i-th sur-
viving company in increasing order of their coordinates. We
have Li = Ri−1 for all i ∈ NS(P).
Proof. (Theorem 3) From (7) we know that when q = 0,
the brand effect factor will be the same to every companies,
regardless of the β value. Thus, we consider β = 0.
For any companies i, other companies’ aggregate prices
at xi = xi are always positive due to distance. This means
that for any companies i, given P−i, i can always set a price
Pi such that Si > 0. Therefore, every company will survive
in the market.
For company i, by Theorem 2 and Lemma 3, we know that
i’s market area will be an interval on the line, with neighbors
always being i − 1, i + 1, which satisfy xi−1 < xi < xi+1.
The right boundary of i− 1 and i can be calculated as:
Pi + (Ri−1 − xi)2 = Pi−1 + (Ri−1 − xi−1)2
Pi + (Ri − xi)2 = Pi+1 + (Ri − xi+1)2
Thus, the utility Wi is given by:
Wi = PiSi = Pi(Ri −Ri−1)
= −P 2i ( 1
2di
+
1
2di−1
)
+Pi(
Pi+1 + x
2
i+1 − x2i
2di
− Pi−1 − x
2
i + x
2
i−1
2di−1
).
Hence, the profit will be a downward parabola for Pi ∈
[0,
Pi+1+x
2
i+1−x2i
2di
−Pi−1−x
2
i+x
2
i−1
2di−1
1
2di
+ 1
2di−1
] and zero otherwise.
We see then the payoff of i is continuous in P, quasi-
concave in Pi. Hence from theorem 1, we see that Nash
equilibrium always exists.
8.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We have seen that Si = Ri−Li > 0 for each sur-
viving company. Consider the right boundary of company
i. We prove Ri = Li+1 by contradiction. Suppose instead
Ri = Lj for some j 6= i+ 1. Then,
Pi{Ri} = Pj{Ri} < Pk{Ri}, ∀k 6= i, j (21)
We have the following cases:
1. Suppose j < i. Then,
Pi{Ri} = Pj{Ri} (22)
By choosing some small positive δ such that x′ = Ri−
δ ∈ Si, we have:
Pi{x′} − Pj{x′} = 2δ(xi − xj) > 0 (23)
which is an obvious contradiction to x′ ∈ Si.
2. Now suppose j > i+ 1, we show below that i+ 1 will
have no market area.
(a) Consider the interval [Ri,∞). Since Ri = Lj , we
know that Pj{Ri} ≤ Pi+1{Ri}. Let x′ = Ri+∆x
for some small ∆x. We have:
Pj{x′}
=Pj + (Ri − xj)2 + 2∆x(Ri − xj) + (∆x)2 − βSj
=Pj{Ri}+ 2∆x(Ri − xj) + (∆x)2
Similarly,
Pi+1{x′} = Pi+1{Ri}+ 2∆x(Ri − xi+1) + (∆x)2.
Thus,
Pi+1{x′} − Pj{x′} ≥ Pi+1{Ri} − Pj{Ri}
+ 2∆x(xj − xi+1) > 0, ∀x′ > Ri
This means that there is no x ∈ [Ri,∞) such that
O(x) = i+ 1, i.e., company i+ 1 has zero market
area.
(b) Consider the interval (−∞, Ri). We know that
Pi{Ri} ≤ Pi+1{Ri}. Let x′ = Ri −∆x. Similar
to the argument above, we obtain:
Pi+1{x′} − Pi{x′}
=Pi+1{Ri} − Pi{Ri}+ 2∆x(xi+1 − xi) > 0, ∀x′ < Ri
(24)
From the above, we see that the right neighbor of i must be
i+ 1. Otherwise i+ 1 will not survive.
8.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. When the market is at equilibrium, we have:
dWi
dPi
= Si + Pi
dSi
dPi
= 0
and
dSi
dPi
=
1
2di
+
1
2di−1
.
Combining these two equations, we have proved the theo-
rem:
Pi
Si
=
2didi−1
di + di−1
, ∀i ∈ N (25)
8.6 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Similar to Theorem 3, we consider β = 0. First
we show that Si(Pi) and Wi = PiSi are continuous. For
one neighbor j of i, set an axis with xi,xj on it. Then, the
boundary of i and j will be a straight line perpendicular
to this axis. Let x′i, x
′
j denote the coordinate of i, j on the
axis and choose the direction of the axis so that x′i < x
′
j
(see Fig. 2). Denote dij = xj − xi. Doing so, we turn the
problem between i, j into an 1D problem. Let x′ij denote
the coordinate of the boundary on this axis. We have the
following equations when Pi is changed by a small dPi, where
dx′ij denotes the corresponding deviation of x
′
ij :
Pi + (x
′
i − x′ij)2 = Pj + (x′j − x′ij)2 (26)
Pi + dPi + (x
′
i − x′ij − dx′)2 = Pj + (x′j − x′ij − dx′)2.(27)
Thus, we have:
dxij = − dPi
2dij
. (28)
Hence,
lim
dPi→0
Si(Pi + dPi)− Si(Pi) =
∑
j∈NB(i)
lijdxi,j
=
∑
j∈NB(i)
− lijdPi
2dij
= 0, (29)
where lij is the length of boundary between i, j. Thus,
Si(Pi) is continuous and piecewise differentiable, and
dSi
dPi
=
∑
j∈NB(i)
− lij
2dij
< 0. (30)
Since Wi(Pi) = PiSi, Wi is also continuous in P. Now let Pi
increase from 0 to Pupper (fixing P−i). The polygon S ′i will
continuously shrink and eventually disappear. If there exists
a positive price such that profit becomes zero, denote it as
Pi,max. We know that for Pi ∈ [Pi,max, Pupper], Wi(Pi) = 0.
Consider any time during the shrinking process and con-
sider an edge of the polygon, say the boundary between i
and j. We know that there must be at least one more com-
pany besides i, j that provides the same lowest price at each
of these two endpoints (See Fig. 4(a)). Denote them by k
and h. Then, we can use xkj = (xkj , ykj), xjh = (xjh, yjh)
to denote two endpoint of this boundary line, i.e., Pi{xkj} =
Pj{xkj} = Pk{xkj}, Pi{xjh} = Pj{xjh} = Ph{xjh}, and we
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Figure 4: Boundary lines at prices Pi and Pi − dPi
are shown in the figure. Figure (a) captures the
moment before lij disappears, which is thoroughly
discussed in the proof. Here xkh donotes the in-
tersection point of the extended boundary line of
lik and lih, others are similar. From this fig-
ure we see that at Pi − dPi, the boundary line is
xukxkjxjhxhv, which becomes x′ukx′khx
′
hv at Pi. Co-
efficients Mik, Nik, Cik,1, Cik,2 Mih, Nih, Cih,1, Cih,2 have
changed along with the shape of i’s market area.
Discontinuity of d
2Wi
dP2i
arises from this saltus. Figure
(b) captures the situation when a potential competi-
tor j starts to gain profit. The proof is similar to (a)
using the triangle inequality.
have following equations:
Pi + (xkj − xi)2 + (ykj − yi)2 = Pj + (xkj − xj)2 + (ykj − yj)2
Pk + (xkj − xk)2 + (ykj − yk)2 = Pj + (xkj − xj)2 + (ykj − yj)2
Pi + (xjh − xi)2 + (yjh − yi)2 = Pj + (xjh − xj)2 + (yjh − yj)2
Ph + (xjh − xh)2 + (yjh − yh)2 = Pj + (xjh − xj)2 + (yjh − yj)2
In the following, we first express lij as an explicit function
of Pi with these equations. Then, we calculate the second
derivative of Wi and prove the quasi-concavity of Wi. To
this end, define
Tji = Pj + x
2
j + y
2
j − x2i − y2i
Tjk = Pj − Pk + x2j + y2j − x2k − y2k
Tjh = Pj − Ph + x2j + y2j − x2h − y2h,
and let
|Akj | =
∣∣∣∣ 2(xj − xi) 2(yj − yi)2(xj − xk) 2(yj − yk)
∣∣∣∣
|Ajh| =
∣∣∣∣ 2(xj − xi) 2(yj − yi)2(xj − xh) 2(yj − yh)
∣∣∣∣
The endpoints xm and xn can then be expressed as:
xkj =
∣∣∣∣ Tji − Pi 2(yj − yi)Tjk 2(yj − yk)
∣∣∣∣
|Akj | ,
ykj =
∣∣∣∣ 2(xj − xi) Tji − Pi2(xj − xk) Tjk
∣∣∣∣
|Akj | ,
xjh =
∣∣∣∣ Tji − Pi 2(yj − yi)Tjh 2(yj − yh)
∣∣∣∣
|Ajh| ,
yjh =
∣∣∣∣ 2(xj − xi) Tji − Pi2(xj − xh) Tjh
∣∣∣∣
|Ajh| .
Thus, the length of the boundary line lij can be expressed
as:
l2ij = (xkj − xjh)2 + (ykj − yjh)2
= (
∣∣∣∣ Tji 2(yj − yi)Tkj 2(yj − yk)
∣∣∣∣− 2Pi(yj − yk)
|Akj |
−
∣∣∣∣ Tji 2(yj − yi)Tjh 2(yj − yh)
∣∣∣∣− 2Pi(yj − yh)
|Ajh| )
2
+(
∣∣∣∣ 2(xj − xi) Tji2(xj − xk) Tkj
∣∣∣∣+ 2Pi(xj − xk)
|Akj |
−
∣∣∣∣ 2(xj − xi) Tji2(xj − xh) Tjh
∣∣∣∣+ 2Pi(xj − xh)
|Ajh| )
2
= (2MijPi + Cij,1)
2 + (2NijPi + Cij,2)
2. (31)
In (31), we have used
Mij =
yj − yh
|Ajh| −
yj − yk
|Akj |
Nij =
xj − xk
|Akj | −
xj − xh
|Ajh|
Cij,1 =
∣∣∣∣ Tji 2(yj − yi)Tkj 2(yj − yk)
∣∣∣∣
|Akj | −
∣∣∣∣ Tji 2(yj − yi)Tjh 2(yj − yh)
∣∣∣∣
|Ajh|
Cij,2 =
∣∣∣∣ 2(xj − xi) Tji2(xj − xk) Tkj
∣∣∣∣
|Akj | −
∣∣∣∣ 2(xj − xi) Tji2(xj − xh) Tjh
∣∣∣∣
|Ajh|
. Therefore, lij is continuous and differentiable, and
dlij
dPi
=
1
2lij
·d(lij)
2
dPi
=
[4(M2ij +N
2
ij)Pi + 2(MijCij,1 +NijCij,2)]
lij
(32)
So far, we have looked at lij . The next step is to prove Wi’s
quasi-concavity. We have:
dWi
dPi
= Si + Pi
dSi
dPi
= Si − Pi
∑
j∈NB(i)
lij
2dij
(33)
dWi
dPi
is also piecewise differentiable. Moreover,
d2Wi
dP 2i
= −2
∑
j∈NB(i)
lij
2dij
− Pi
∑
j∈NB(i)
1
2dij
· dlij
dPi
(34)
Note that if for any Pi0 that satisfies
dWi
dPi
|Pi=Pi0 = 0, we
always have:
d2Wi
dP 2i
|Pi=Pi0 ≤ 0, (35)
then Wi will be quasiconcave. The most challenging part
here is when during the shrinking process, the shape of poly-
gon S ′i may change.
For example, during the increment of Pi, lij can shrink
to a point and eventually disappear, at some Pi when j is
no longer neighbor of i. Therefore, d
2Wi
dP2i
will be a piece-
wise function, with each piece starting at the time when one
boundary line of i disappears. Yet from (33) we know that
dWi
dPi
is continuous because the moment lik starts to appear
or disappear, we have lik = 0. Fig. 4(a) shows the boundary
line of i at price Pir − dP and Pir, where at Pir boundary
lij∗ disappears. In Fig. 4(a), lij∗ intersects with lik∗ and
lih∗ before disappearing. The two endpoints of lij∗ here are
denoted by xkj and xhj . Situation that a potential com-
petitor j starts to gain profit is presented in Fig. 4(b). The
proof of this situation is similar and is hence omitted for
brevity.
Now for any piece of Wi, we can write it as:
d2Wi
dP 2i
=−
∑
j∈NB(i)
l2ij + Pi[2(M
2
ij +N
2
ij)Pi + (MijCij,1 +NijCij,2)]
dij lij
(36)
Plugging (31) into the above, we get:
d2Wi
dP 2i
= −
∑
j∈NB(i)
(
6(M2ij +N
2
ij)P
2
i + 5(MijCij,1 +NijCij,2)Pi
dij lij
+
C2ij,1 + C
2
ij,2
dij lij
) = −
∑
j∈NB(i)
6(M2ij +N
2
ij)
dij lij
· P 2i
−
∑
j∈NB(i)
5(MijCij,1 +NijCij,2)
dij lij
· Pi −
∑
j∈NB(i)
C2ij,1 + C
2
ij,2
dij lij
.
(37)
Thus, every piece of Wi is the sum of a series of parabolas,
which is a downward parabola. In each piece of Wi, we can
calculate the price P ∗ij , at which lij shrinks to zero, i.e.,
l2ij = (2MijP
∗
ij+Cij,1)
2+(2NijP
∗
ij+Cij,2)
2 = 0, ∀j ∈ NB(i)
(38)
Thus, the right discontinuity point Pir of each piece of
d2Wi
dP2i
is decided by the time when Pi reach the smallest P
∗
ij :
Pir = min
j
P ∗ij j ∈ NB(i). (39)
This means at Pi = Pir, there exists only one j
∗ ∈ NB(i),
such that length of boundary line lij∗ becomes 0. Starting
from Pi = P
∗
ij , S ′i change its shape and the coefficients re-
lated to j∗, i.e., Mik, Nik, Cik,1, Cik,2,Mih, Nih, Cih,1, Cih,2,
also change.
Let f(Pi; i, j) =
6(M2ij+N
2
ij)P
2
i +5(MijCij,1+NijCij,2)Pi+C
2
ij,1+C
2
ij,2
dij lij
,
which is a parabola function of Pi. From (37), we know
that d
2Wi
dP2i
= −∑j∈NB(i) f(Pi; i, j), we can take d2WidP2i as
sum of a group of parabolas f(Pi; i, j). In any pieces of
d2Wi
dP2i
, we know from equations (38) and (39) that Pir =
−Cij∗,1
2Mij∗
= −Cij∗,2
2Nij∗
and P ∗ij = −Cij∗,12Mij∗ = −
Cij∗,2
2Nij∗
> Pir for
any j ∈ NB(i) and j 6= j∗. Since all the axis of symmetry of
f(Pi; i, j) are larger than Pir, the axis of symmetry of
d2Wi
dP2i
will also larger than Pir,. Hence, each piece of
d2Wi
dP2i
is a piece
of downward parabola on the left of its symmetry axis and
is increasing (See Fig. 3 for an example). Let
d2W ′i
dP2i
|Pi=Pir
denote the value of the next piece of parabola
d2W ′i
dP2i
starting
at Pir. If we can prove
d2W ′i
dP2i
|Pi=Pir > d
2Wi
dP2i
|Pi=Pir , then
d2Wi
dP2i
is an increasing function on [0, Pmax).
To prove the increasing property, we need to take a look
at what is happening at Pir. At P = Pir, a boundary line
lij∗ shrinks to 0. After this shrink, lik∗ ,lih∗ , which are used
to intersect with lij∗ , start to intersect themselves, since
j∗ no longer being a neighbor of i. The boundary line
xukxkjxjhxhv changes to x′ukx′khx
′
hv, as shown in Fig. 4(a).
Consider the intersection point xkh of extended line. Since
P−i is fixed and Pi is increasing, we know that xkh must be
on the boundary line between k∗ and h∗, and move towards
the inside of convex polygon S ′i during the increment of Pi.
Now we study the change in length of these boundarys.
Consider xukxkh and x′ukx
′
kh. We see that they are par-
allel because the movement of boundary is perpendicular
to the connecting line of i, k. Let us denote dxukxkh =
x′ukx
′
kh − xukxkh in Fig. 4, and set an axis parallel to de-
scribe both xukxkh and x′ukx
′
kh. Then, the 1D coordinates
for the endpoints xuk,x
′
uk,xkh,x
′
kh,xkj on this axis will be
xuk, x
′
uk, xkh, x
′
kh, xkj . Suppose we choose the direction of
axis such that xkh > xkj > xku. Then, we can express the
change of length of xukxkh in 1D as follows:
dxukxkh = x′ukx
′
kh − xukxkh
= (x′kh − x′uk)− (xkh − xuk)
= dxkh − dxuk
Similarly, we have dxukxkj = dxkj − dxuk. Also, lik∗ =
xukxkj becomes l
′
ik∗ = x
′
ukx
′
kh. With the same axis, we
have dlik∗ = dxkj − dxuk = (x′kh − xkj)− dxuk.
From Fig. 4, we see that
xkjxkh = −dxkjxkh
= −d(xukxkh − lik∗)
= dxkj − dxkh
= x′kh − xkj − x′kh + xkh
= xkh − xkj > 0 (40)
Similarly, we have xkhxjh = (−dxkhxhv)−(−dlih∗). From
the triangle inequality, we know that xkjxkh + xkhxjh ≥
xkjxjh, i.e.,
(−dxukxkh)− (−dlik∗) + (−dxkhxhv)− (−lih∗) ≥ −dlij∗
(41)
Due to the continuity of
d2W ′i
dP2i
, we know that
dxukxkh
dPi
|Pir−dPir→Pir =
dl′ik∗
dPi
|Pi=Pir ,
and that
dxkhxhv
dPi
|Pir−dPir→Pir =
dl′ih∗
dPi
|Pi=Pir .
Thus, we have from (41) that:
d2W ′i
dP 2i
|Pi=Pir −
d2Wi
dP 2i
|Pi=Pir
=
d2Wik∗
dP 2i
|Pi→Pir− +
d2Wih∗
dP 2i
|Pi→Pir−
−(d
2Wik∗
dP 2i
|Pi→Pir+
d2Wih∗
dP 2i
|Pi→Pir+ +
d2Wij∗
dP 2i
|Pi→Pir+)
=
dlik∗
dPi
+
dlih∗
dPi
+
dlij∗
dPi
− dxukxkh
dPi
− dxkhxhv
dPi
≥ 0. (42)
Combining these results, we have that d
2Wi
dP2i
is a piece-
wise increasing function, and each piece is a fragment of an
increasing downward parabola.
Now we confirm the quasiconcavity of Wi(Pi). We first
have W (Pi) ≥ 0 for Pi ∈ [0,∞). If d2WidP2i < 0 in [0, Pupper],
since Wi(Pi) is continuous, we know Wi(Pi) is quasiconcave.
Otherwise we consider the case when Pi,max exists. Since
dWi
dPi
(Pi,max) < 0,
dWi
dPi
(0) > 0, and we know that d
2Wi
dP2i
is
monotone, dWi
dPi
will be non-decreasing before maximum and
then non-increasing until Pi = Pi,max, which means
dWi
dPi
is
quasiconcave.
If Pi,max does not exists, W (Pupper) > 0. Yet we know
that the left side derivative of Wi(Pi) will be negative at
Pupper, since Pupper is high enough such that increment in
price only leads to market area decrease. Similarly we can
prove the quasiconcavity of Wi(Pi).
Since W (Pi) is continuous in Pj , ∀j ∈ NB(i) and qua-
siconcave, from Theorem 1, Nash equilibrium always ex-
ists.
8.7 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Based on the discussion in the proof of Theorem
5, we know that when market is at equilibrium,
dWi
dPi
= Si + Pi
dSi
dPi
= 0
and
dSi
dPi
=
∑
j∈NB(i)
− lij
2dij
,
which give us the theorem:
Pi =
1∑
j∈NR(i)
lij
2dij
Si, ∀i ∈ N .
8.8 Proof of Theorem 7
To prove Theorem 7, we need the following lemmas, whose
proof will be given after the proof.
Lemma 4. Company i’s potential competitor j provides
the same aggregate price as i only at the boundary of i.
Proof. (Theorem 7) We first consider the situation when
no “wipe out” happens in the market, that is,
β <
2didi−1
di + di−1
∀i ∈ N . (43)
Based on the discussion in Section 6.1, we know that
Si(Pi) is piecewise continuous, we still need to prove that
Si(Pi) is continuous at the junction point between two pieces.
Without loss of generality, suppose i’s right neighbor changes
from j to u after the junction point while left neighbor re-
mains k. From Lemma 3 we know that xi < xu < xj .
According to Lemma 4, we know that at the junction point
of Si, there must exists a potential competitor u provides the
same aggregate price at i and j’s boundary point. Otherwise
if i has no potential competitors, we can show that i’s neig-
bors will not change. This can be explained in the following
two cases :(i) If i increases an infinitely small price, since i
has no potential competitors, then customers at border of
i will immediately choose only from current neighbors of i.
Hence i’s neighbor will have an increment in market area,
and no new neighbor of i appears during price increment. (ii)
If i lower its price by an infinitely small amount, each neigh-
bor of i will suffer from a market area loss. We still need to
say that during this process, no neighbor of i will disappear,
as long as the price decrease of i is small enough. This is
because for any neighbor of i, say j, though it suffers from
a market area decrease, yet its neighbor t ∈ NR(j), t 6= i
will increase its market area and provides lower price at j
and t’s old boundary(the boundary between j and k before
i decreases its price), thus no potential competitor of j can
start to survive. In this case, we rule out the probability
that j will be wiped out.
After a sufficiently small increase of Pi, u begins to survive
and gradually increase its market area starting from zero,
which means i do not suffer any sudden drop in market
share. After then, i’s neighbor change into k and u, and
dSi/dPi also change. So far we have shown that Si(Pi)
is continuous and piece-wise differentiable (the derivative
changes when the neighbors change), so as Wi(Pi) = PiSi.
Each continuous piece of Si(Pi) is a concave function.
That is because the growth rate of dSi
dPi
will always be non-
positive. To understand this¨ıijNˇ we can consider the follow-
ing fact. Let δ > 0 be a sufficiently small value, we will
be able to conclude that in each continuous piece of Si(Pi)
we have 0 > dSi
dPi
|Pi−δ > dSidPi |Pi+δ. The reason is i’s market
area become smaller at Pi+ δ compare to Pi− δ, while both
its neighbors enjoy market area increment during the same
time, which will lead to more market area shrink for i at
Pi + δ than at Pi − δ, since one’s market area has positive
feedback when q = 1.
We now prove the fact that at any junction point (a break
point between two pieces), Pjunc of Wi, if the left deriva-
tive of Wi(Pjunc) is negative, then the right derivative of
Wi(Pjunc) will also be negative. Thus, W will monotoni-
cally increase to a maximum point and then monotonically
decrease, which is quasiconcave. Since dWi
dPi
= Si + Pi
dSi
dPi
,
we only need to consider the change in dSi
dPi
at Pi = Pjunc.
Let dSi
dPi
|Pjunc+ denote the right derivative of Si at Pjunc and
dSi
dPi
|Pjunc− for the left derivative. By proving dSidPi |Pjunc+ <
dSi
dPi
|Pjunc− we can achieve our goal.
At Pi = Pjunc, we have Pi{Ri} = Pj{Ri} = Pu{Ri}.
Suppose u does not exist and Pi has a positive deviation
dPi → 0, we can represent the price at i’s new bound-
ary R′i as P
′
i{R′i} = P ′j{R′i}. We can see that P ′i{R′i} =
Pi{Ri}+dPi+2dRi(Ri−xi)+(dRi)2−βdSi. Consider the
fact that customers at i and j’s boundary suffers the highest
price from i or j, because they are farthest to their suppli-
ers. Hence, if during the dPi increment, Pu{R′} > P ′i{R′},
then no customers will choose to buy from u, thus u will
not survive and j will remain i’s neighbor. Since we con-
sider the situation when u starts to survive, we know that
Pu{R′} < P ′i{R′}, and that right boundary of i has shrunk
more compare to the situation when j being its neighbor, so
does the left boundary of i. Thus, dSi
dPi
|Pjunc+ < dSidPi |Pjunc−.
Hence, Wi(Pi) is a quasiconcave function and Wi(Pi) = 0.
If there exists a positive price such that Wi(Pi) = 0, denote
it as Pi,max. We can see that for Pi ≥ Pi,max, Wi(Pi) = 0.
According to Theorem 1, since Wi(P) is continuous in
P ∈ [0, Pupper]N and quasiconcave in Pi, Nash equilibrium
exists when no “wipe out” can happens.
For the case when condition (43) does not hold, we can
operate in the following way to give at least one equilibrium.
We choose some companies to be hidden, which means they
can be seen as not existed in the market, while the others
being “activated.” For the simplicity in presentation below,
we define a condition among those activated companies:
β <
2didi−1
di + di−1
∀ activated company i. (44)
The way we choose is as follow: (i) Hide all companies first.
Then activate companies one by one until we can not acti-
vate any one more companies without bringing “wipe out”
phenomenon into the market. That is, all activated compa-
nies satisfied the condition (44), but activating any one of
the hidden companies will violates it. (ii) Then we will check
that when any one hidden company, say j, is activated, it
violates the inequality β <
2djdj−1
dj+dj−1 . Otherwise according to
(i), there must exists one or two of its neighbors, say k, such
that β >
2dkdk−1
dk+dk−1
. Then we activate j and hide k. (iii) Now
we can guarantee that all activated companies satisfy the
condition (44), while each hidden company is being “wiped
out”.
Then for activated companies there exists equilibrium as
proved before. Now let those hidden companies come back to
the market with price Pupper. From the analysis of equation
(15), we can see that hidden company i will never survive by
unilateral price change. For any activated company j, since
hidden companies are at the status of price being Pupper and
have no market area, they can never survive by j’s unilateral
action. Hence, j’s price will remain unchanged. This setting
guarantees at least one equilibrium when (43) does not hold.
Concluding all the results above, we have proved the ex-
istence of Nash equilibrium in 1D market with q = 1.
8.9 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Suppose i’s potential competitor j satisfy the
condition (1) in Definition 6. Since Sj = 0, we can show
that j only has at most one point of market area. This is
because we can use similar method in Theorem 2 to show
that j’s market point set is convex, i.e., line segment in 1D
market, and since Sj = 0, j has only one market point. Since
price on the boundary of i is highest price among all points
in cl(Si), j can only provide the same price at a boundary
point of i. Otherwise we can always find a nonzero neigh-
borhood of V(x), where Pj{x} = Pi{x}, x ∈ cl(Si), such
that ∃x′ ∈ V(x), Pj{x′} < Pi{x′}, which violates Sj = 0.
Since we consider the 1D market, i’s potential competitor
j will never satisfy the condition (2) in Definition 6. This is
because i only has two boundary points in 1D market, for
any neighbor k of i, we must have |cl(Sk)∩cl(Si)||BR(i)| =
1
2
.
8.10 Proof of Theorem 9
Theorem 9. When a market with dimension K is at a
Nash equilibrium, for any company i, if it has no potential
competitors,
P ∗i = ci · S∗i , ∀i ∈ NS (45)
where ci = − dPidSi |Pi=P∗i > 0.
Otherwise, we have:
c′i · S∗i ≤ P ∗i ≤ c′′i · S∗i , ∀i ∈ NS . (46)
Here c′i = − dPidSi |Pi=P∗i + > 0, c
′′
i = − dPidSi |Pi=P∗i − > 0.
Inequality (46) becomes an equality only when i’s potential
competitor does not survive at P ∗i .
We know from Theorem 7 that Wi(Pi) is continuous.
First we prove the result when i has no potential competi-
tors at equilibrium. This condition guarantees that with an
infinitely small deviation of price of company i, its neighbors
will remain the same, as explained in the proof of Theorem
7, which also ensures that the payoff function is continuous
and differentiable here.
Note that the analysis above is insensitive to q and market
dimension K. Hence we have for i at equilibrium,
dWi
dPi
= Si + Pi
dSi
dPi
= 0. (47)
Thus, we prove the first equation (45) of the theorem.
P ∗i = ci · S∗i , ∀i ∈ NS
where ci = − dPidSi |Pi=P∗i > 0.
For the situation when i has potential competitors at equi-
librium, Wi(P
∗
i ) may not be differentiable here since Si(Pi)
changes after the potential competitors survives. We thus
consider the left and right derivatives at P ∗i . Since the mar-
ket is at the equilibrium, any unilateral deviation of P ∗i will
decrease i’s payoff. Hence, we must have:
dWi
dPi
|P∗i − > 0,
dWi
dPi
|P∗i + < 0 (48)
These two inequalities imply that Wi reaches its maximum
at P ∗i , i.e., Wi increases before P
∗
i and decreases after it.
Plugging (48) into (47) we prove inequality (46) of the the-
orem. It can be seen that if i’s potential competitors did
not survive at P ∗i , the form of Si will not change. Hence,
Wi will be differentiable at P
∗
i , and inequality (46) becomes
equation (45).
Summing results above proves the theorem.
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